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THE APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
TO FOREIGN AID
Before examining how the constitutional standards discussed in
Part I might be applied to foreign aid, it is necessary to consider
briefly first, the reasons for the constitutional standards that have
developed and, second, the foreign aid program itself.
FACTORS WEIGHED IN STRIKING THE BALANCE REFLECTED IN
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

Most of the reasons adduced by the courts, the executive, the
Congress, and the writers for striking the balance where they have
with respect to the President's foreign affairs powers do not go
expressly to his exclusive powers, but rather to explain why he has
independent powers in foreign affairs in contrast to the delegated
powers he must largely rely on in domestic affairsP1 However, it can
be assumed that the reasons enunciated to support the executive's

independent powers, that is, the ability to act in the absence of
congressional action, may also become reasons to support its
exclusive powers, permitting the executive to act alone, free of
congressional control.21 s
217. There is clearly a "domestic" core of government decisions and relevant powers, and
another separate "foreign" core. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936) ("federal power over external affairs [is] in origin and essential character different
from that over internal affairs"); cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring, distinguishes between national force "turned against the
outside world" from that "turned inward"). But, nevertheless, there is a recognizable and
"growing comingling of foreign and domestic affairs." Walker, Our Foreign Affairs
Machinery: Time for an Overhaul, 47 FoPEIGN AFFAIRS 309, 310 (1969). For example, Mr.
Walker notes that there are 56 United States government agencies, many of them "domestic,"
with representatives in one or more foreign countries. Id.
218. One school would put all executive power-and the term may beg the question-in the
President unless the Constitution clearly provides otherwise. See note 171 supra (Thomas
Jefferson's statement that the transaction of all foreign affairs is Executive unless the
Constitution specifies otherwise). This was the position of Alexander Hamilton in his debate
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External Necessity; Executive Efficiency and Expertise

John Locke enunciated the basic difference between the
international order of nation-states and the domestic order of a nation-

state: "[F]or though in a commonwealth the members of it are...
governed by the laws of the society, yet in reference to the rest of
mankind they make one body, which is. . . still in the state of nature
.. *."219 Charles de Visscher has suggested the implications of this
"instability [of relations], exceptional in the internal order . . . [: it]

is the more or less general condition of the international order,
dominated and constantly troubled.

. .

by the factor of force."

22 0

With international law and organization largely insufficient to ensure
the security of nation-states, their right to secure their own essential

interests becomes the condition of minimum world order. 22 1

with James Madison: "The general doctrine of our Constitution then is, that the executive power
of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications, which
are expressed in the instrument." E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS 11-12 (1917) [hereinafter cited as CORWiN-FOREIGN RELATIONS]; Senator
Spooner, Id. at 169; cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 1967);
Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act. 39 COLUM. L. REv. 751,753 (1939).
Theodore Roosevelt took a similar position with respect to all matters, foreign and domestic:
"[T]he executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in
the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view was that
every executive officer. . . was a steward of the people. . . . My belief was that it was not only
his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action
was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. . . I did not usurp power, but I did greatly
broaden the use of executive power.' T. ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1913). A
discussion of the judicial power in Karsas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), similarly begs the
question:
[United States Constitution art. I treatment] of legislative powers, does not make a
general grant of legislative powers, . . on the other hand. .. [a]rticle (11l). . . [which]
reads that "the judicial power shall be vested . . ." [grants] the entire judicial power of
the Nation. . . . There may be, of course, limitations in that grant ofpower, but if there
are any, they must be expressed; for otherwise the general grant would vest in the courts
all the judicial power which the new nation was capable of exercising... . "' 206 U.S. at
81-83.
219. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, § 145 (1690). See also
id. §§ 146, 148. A domestic insurrection may present problems in some ways comparable to
those of the external order.
220. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (1957).
221. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executiveor PresidentialAgreements:
InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPolicy: 1. 54 YALE L.J. 181,185-86(1945) [hereinafter
cited as McDougal & Lans]. Compare the Supreme Court's reference to the foreign affairs
powers as "necessary concomitants of nationality." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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Presumably President Kennedy had this state of affairs in mind when
speaking during the Cuban missile crisis:
[T]he United States has the means as a sovereign power to defend itself ....
We would hope to exercise [that power]. . . in a way consistent with our triaty
obligations, including the United Nations Charter. But we, of course, keep to
ourselves and hold to ourselves under the United States Constitution and under
the laws of international law, the right to defend our security. On our own, if
necessary . . . [we will act] to protect our survival or integrity or other
vital interests.!n

Our survival and security, being of paramount importance to us, have
been entrusted to the governmental institution best equipped to assure

them. As a nation we have concluded that the institutional
capacities 2 of the executive branch, or at least relative to those of the
Congress, are superior for the task. 24 An examination of these
superior executive capacities and the corollary congressional
deficiencies is therefore appropriate.
The executive, as an institution, has a greater involvement in, and
sense of, world power relations and dynamics than does the
Congress?2 Professor Corwin, not an especial friend of Presidential
power, notes that "the President occupies a superior position from
which to descry the approach of crisis, especially crisis in the
international field." 2 The executive has greater knowledge of other
nations' interests and policies and their view of our policies and
222. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1962 at 836 (1963) (press
conference).
223. Thus, it is the capacities of Congrcss as an institution, rather than its individual
members, with which we are concerned. Compare the reference to "the competency ofdissimilar
institutions [the executive and the courts] to make and implement particular kinds of decision in
the area of international relations." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,404
(1964).
224. Certainly the executive has deficiencies. It has been suggested that the bureaucracy
suffers from two forms of inertia: (I) its rigidity, as suggested by Henry Kissinger in the N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1968, at 57, col. 3, and (2) its difficult-to-control momentum, suggested inter alla
by R. NEUSTADT,

PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960). Indeed, a

"bureaucratic model" of foreign policy formulation has been proposed. Hilsman, The
Foreign-Policy Consensus; 613 CONFLICT RESOLUTION 361 (1959);

RAND CORPORATION

REPORT, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 3919 (1968).

Senator Fulbright has also suggested that too many of our top foreign policy people are not
sufficiently professional. Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 2Oth Century Under an 18th
Century Constitution,47 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (196 1) [hereinafter cited as Fulbright, 20th Century].
225. Notwithstanding the fact that the Congress has delegated much authority to the
executive, suggesting the practical necessity for executive action in domestic affairs as well, it
remains true that the dynamics of domestic affairs are different from those of international ones.
Cf.note 219 supra and accompanying text.
226. E. CORWIN. THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 at Ch. VII n.76 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as CORWIN-- PRESIDENT].
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actions.

227

Senator William Fulbright has acknowledged the

'"specialized skills''

228

of the executive, and it is clear that the

executive has far greater expertise in diplomacy, skill in the

administration of aid, n experience in communicating across cultures,
and receptivity to the sensibilities of other nations and cultures. A
possibly greater virtue of the executive is its ability to apply the "force

of society" to the national security and related interests. As
enunciated by Locke:
Though. . .the executive and federative power (the power of war and peace,
leagues, and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and
communities without the commonwealth) of every community be really distinct
in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in
the hands of distinct persons. For both of them [require] . . .the force of
society for their exercise....3

It has often been noted by the Supreme Court that in foreign affairs
the nation must speak with "one voice."?' That voice will usually be
the President's because, as "the political focus of high policy and
politics"' 21 and the "highest point of governmental leadership,"' 31 he
will be closest to the international order.
227. For example, the concerned members of the executive may have greater awarness of

foreign reliance on our commitments than will most Congressmen. Note, Presidential
Amendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the Warsaw Convention. 34 U. CH. L.

REV. 580,602 (1967).
228. Hearingson Separation of PowersBefore the Sub comm. on Separationof Powersof the
Sess. 43 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., Ist
Separationof Powers].
229. The administration of foreign aid may well entail far greater involvement in the affairs
of a country than does the more traditional diplomacy. See generally A. KRASSOWSKI, THE AID
RELATIONSHIP

(1968).

230. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIvIL GOVERNMENT §§ 145-46, 148 (1690). Compare

the difficulties experienced by the Confederation, which had no executive. It is probably
significant that while "decentralization" to local institutions has been suggested as a cure for
many of our domestic ills, no sort of "decentralization" has been suggested for the conduct of
the core area of our foreign affairs. Rather, it has been suggested that in the most important
areas of foreign affairs, any considerable measure of increased decentralization, even within the
executive, may not be feasible. Hearings on Administration of National Security Before the
Senate Sub comm. on NationalSecurity Staffing and Operations,88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,at
10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings,NationalSecurity]. Recently efforts have been made to
further coordinate the different foreign programs within the executive. Compare also the
Supreme Court's exclusion of the states from certain areas of foreign affairs. E.g., Zschernig v.
Miller, 339 U.S. 429 (1968).
231. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). "Such questions [touching foreign relations] uniquely demand single-voiced
statements of the Government's views." 369 U.S. at 211.
232. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 203 n.13 (4th ed. 1960) [hereinafter
cited as GELLHORN & BYsE].
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The President is in the best position to escape special interests,
apply a unified policy, and integrate our various foreign policies and
programs. 4 By contrast, "under the legislative process, individual
proposals may be and frequently are considered severally, far from the
context of total foreign policy. .

.

.This decentralized and disjointed

process is not conducive to the creation of any grand pattern or even
to the consideration of the costs and the alternatives. ' 23 In
recognizing the superior knowledge and information of the executive,
the Supreme Court has said, "[the President], not Congress, has the
better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries . .

. He has his confidential sources of information. He

has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly
necessary .
",31
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in a report of
February 15, 1816 that "[The President] manages our concerns with
foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine
when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the
greatest prospect of success." 231 The superior capacity of the executive
in the negotiating of agreements was recognized in The Federalist No.
75: "qualities..
indispensable in the management of foreign
negotiations point out the executive as the most fit agent in those
transactions." 218 The speed, secrecy, and flexibility of the
executive-qualities often cited as necessary for the effective conduct
of certain aspects of foreign affairs- frequently have been noted. 23'
233. Steelman and Kreager, The Executive Office as Administrative Coordinator, 21 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROS. 688,709 (1956).
234. Senator Jackson has observed that
[o]nly the President stands above all departments and agencies and only he and his
principal lieutenants can see the problems of a country or a region in the perspective of

national policy as a whole. .

.

.The higher the issues are pulled for decision, the greater

the chance that the pressure of special interests can be resisted, that irrelevant

consideration will be screened out, and that material considerations will be properly
weighed. Hearings.NationalSecurity 10.
235. Thorp, Stringson EconomicAid. 44 YALE REviEw 202, 213 (1954).

236. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); cf Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1963); Chicago & S.A.L. v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103, I1i (1948) ("The

President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has
available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the
world.").
237. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
238. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 467 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).

239. See. e.g.. McDougal & Lans 248-52,261-89.
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Vis-a-vis the executive, the deficiencies of the Congress are fairly
obvious. "[T]he Congress, whose members are elected largely on the
basis of local issues, possesses a greater degree of information and
coipetence in domestic matters than it does in the foreign field." ' 0
The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
referred to the Congress as "a decentralized, independent minded and
largely parochial minded body of legislators." '' Its constituents, of
whose interests it is ever conscious, are essentially interested in
domestic issues. However, it is ironic that in domestic affairs, where
executive agencies exercise powers delegated by Congress, they often
have strong independent support among such constituents4 1 which
they can mobilize against the Congress and, thus, sometimes further
the constituents' interests. Neither the State Department nor A ID
have such support to pit against Congress: "Foreign aid, after all, is
a program without a constituency, excepting the poor, hungry
and politically threatened in foreign lands-none of whom can cast a
3
ballot [in the United States]. ' 2
The unwieldiness of the Congress is another deficiency, because
"[it is nothing short of fantastic to assume that the control of foreign
relations could in fact be shared equally by-97 men. '"2' In fact, the
Congress functions largely through committees and subcommittees,
bodies which have their own deficiencies?15
It has been acknowledged that the management of foreign affairs
requires specialist skills, often based on experience, as well as full
time attention. Few members of Congress have the necessary expertise or information. Although congressional foreign travel has increased, 246 it involves a relatively small number of men and is, of
course, very part-time at best. Moreover, because of the demands of
domestic issues, Congressmen do not have the time required to
240. Mathews, The ConstitutionalPower of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345,374 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Mathews].
241. Fulbright, 20th Century 6.
242. M. JEWEEL, SENATORIAL POLITICS.AND FOREIGN POLICY 136 (1962).

243. TIME, July26, 1968, at 25.
244. McDougal & Lans. The 97 in the quotation refers to the President and the 96
members of the Senate in 1945.
245. See notes 251-57 infra and accompanying text.
246.
STATES,

(1962).

ZINN, EXTENT OF THE CONTROL OF THE EXECUTIVE BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 n.29

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:453

master the many complicated issues of foreign affairs 47 Although
members of the executive are also busy, in many cases their time
is devoted to the specialty of foreign affairs. Senator Fulbright has
also acknowledged this fact: "The Senate as a practical matter is
very poorly equipped to deal with day-to-day policy-making or to
try to outguess the President in this field." 4 Furthermore, there is
little incentive for any significant number of Congressmen to
acquire expertise in foreign affairs to a level necessitated by the
realities of the external order. It is difficult to make much public
splash in the Congress over foreign policy-at least through affirmative efforts. The negative criticisms of Senator Keating over the
Cuban missiles, or the late Senator Joseph McCarthy over a range
of issues, are atypical experiences. As foreign affairs are in fact at
the present time largely an executive matter, the prospect of high
executive office might normally be an incentive to the acquisition
of foreign affairs expertise. However, neither the Senate nor the
!9
House are common routes to such office.24
The situation is of course quite different with respect to domestic
matters; the Congress reflects and represents an electorate which
largely constitutes the dynamics of the domestic order. But, as
indicated, Congress knows little of, and is not really party to, the
dynamics of the international order. The principal consequence of this
would seem to be that whereas in domestic affairs it may not be
inappropriate for the Congress to involve itself in rather specific
detail, in foreign affairs the Congress has the capacity to concern itself
only with generalities.
Congress is sometimes preferred to the executive as a repository of
power because it is said to be more democratic. 2 0 Yet, when it
functions through committees and subcommitteesI-certainly with
247. Hilsman, Congressional-ExecutiveRelations and the Foreign Policy Consensus, 52 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 725, 727 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hilsman, Congressional-Executive
Relations].
248. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), at 73-74. To say that Congressmen are
"becoming mired in triiia" seems an exaggeration. Newman & Keaton, Congress and the
FaithfulExecution of Laws-Should LegislatorsSupervise Administratorsd? 41 CALIF. L. REV.
565, 593 (1953). But certainly most are generalists, GELLHORN & BYSE 170; for reasons already
suggested few certainly are foreign affairs specialists. It is therefore probably fair to say that
these factors "conspire to make it impossible for the Congressmen to take a regular part in the
actual formulation of policy with anything approaching consistent responsibility to Executive
interests." Hilsman, Congressional-ExecutiveRelations 739.
249. Compare Senator Fulbright's reference to the Senate as a "disintergrated ministry."
Fulbright. 20th Century 6.
250. See. e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.48, at 333-34 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
251. See notes 271-73 infra and accompanying text.
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respect to foreign affairs-it may lack even that attribute. Moreover,
the committee system may not lend itself to the unified view necessary
for foreign affairs. An initial problem is that the composition of
committees is unrepresentative. "A committee cannot represent any
more than a particular segment of the country, depending upon the
extent of its membership and the areas they are from and the extent of
their jurisdiction. It does not represent the cross-section of public
opinion and of interest that the Congress as a whole represents. ' ' 2
Moreover, as shall be seen, the chairmen, and occasionally other
individual members, have a great influence on the work of committees
and subcommittees. 3 And the method of selection of such committee
chairmen is not always very democratic, 254 nor relevant to the
particular problems the committee considers. For example, the
method used to select the Chairman of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee dealing with foreign aid would seem to have little
relevance to the usual modalities of foreign policy formulation.
Indeed, it has been suggested that Congressman Passman was selected
by the Chairman of the relevant House Appropriations Committee
because of his enmity to foreign aid? 5 It is also clear that committees
respond to special interests and pressure groups. Moreover, the
absence, except as to trade, of a "solid array" of pressure groups with
respect to foreign affairs, so common in domestic affairs,256 removes
another possibly democratic discipline on the committees. A unified
foreign policy is not furthered by the fact that committees often
function semiautonomously of each other. Speaking of the House,
one author has written: "Displayed is a picture of the uncoordinated
control of interrelated foreig policy matters by a host of little
' 2 57
governments upon which the House [has] devolved great powers.
A final deficiency of the Congress arises from the nature of much
present day foreign policy formulation, certainly of the kind that
relates to the core area. George Ball has characterized it as a "surfeit
of pragmatism. ' 258 No doubt there are many explanations for this
252. Hearings,Separation of Powers 125 (Deputy Director Hughes, Bureau of the Budget);

id. at 248 (Professor Bickel).
253. See notes 272-73 infra and note 340 infra and accompanying text.
254. See generally R. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1964).
255. D. MORROW, CONGRESS AND ICA: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, 1953-60 at 48 (1961).
256. Hilsman, Congressional-ExecutiveRelations727.
257. H. CARROLL, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 89 (1958).

258. G. BALL, THE DISCIPLINE OF POWER 27 & 343 (1968). See generally Hilsman,
supra note 224.
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state of affairs. One reason would seem to be the sheer number of
problems calling for decisions, with time at the top for only the really
urgent ones.sO At the same time, given the rapidity of change in the
world, the conflicting factual reports, the frequent urgency of
decision, and other factors, it is clear that many decisions will always
represent extremely fine calculations, often founded on one's deepest
instinct and judgment and not lending themselves to systematic
articulation or defense 6 No doubt the workings of the bureaucracy
contribute to this approach. In any case it is not clear that the
deliberative processes of Congress, which may be required to quickly
revise legislative restrictions, 61 can readily be more closely related to
this pragmatic mode of operation.
In light of all these factors, many of which have long been
apparent, it is not surprising that although the Constitution is not as
explicit as it might be, the Founding Fathers fairly clearly intended the

executive to have principal responsibility for foreign affairs,"' much
as in other countries.263 Certainly this.was the position of such
theorists as Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, by whom the
Founders were greatly influenced.264 Quincy Wright has noted that the
259. Hilsman, supra note 258, at 372.
260. Hearings, NationalSecurity 86.
261. See notes 268-73 infra and accompanying text.
262. See CORWiN-FoREIGN RELATIONS 166. See also C. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE
EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (1920) [hereinafter cited as BERDAHL]; Q. WRIGHT, THE
CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT-FOREIGN

RELATIONS].
263. Probably reflecting the historic fact that the executive in most countries has had
responsibility for foreign affairs, international law accords it substantial authority to conclude
agreements. Legal Status of East Greenland, P.C.I.J., serv. A/B, No. 53 (1933); RESTATEMENT
SECOND OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 123 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
264. Debates at the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions contain
little on the exclusive powers of the President. See generally CORWIN- PRESIDENT Ch. V;
CORWIN-FoREIGN RELATIONS; WRIGHT, FOREIGN RELATIONS; Mathews; McDougal & Lans.
The prior colonial and Confederation periods shed little light. During the former the royal
government in London was principally responsible for foreign affairs. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). See also J. BURNS, CONTROVERSIES
BETWEEN ROYAL GOVERNORS AND THEIR ASSEMBLIES IN THE NORTHERN AMERICAN COLONIES

(1923); 0. DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT: 1696-1765 (1939); H. EGERTON,
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF GREATER BRITAIN (1924); E. GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOIi IN
THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA (1966). The local governors did in fact have some
responsibility for relations with Indians and other colonies, and the local assemblies on
occasions used the power of the purse to influence the governor. BURNS, supra, at 416; GREENE,
supra, at 192-93. During the Confederation period there was no executive. ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, art. IX, cl. 1. Indeed the weakness of the Confederation in foreign affairs
because of the lack of an executive was one of the principal causes for the calling of the
Constitutional Convention in 1787. McDougal & Lans 221 & n.34.

FOREIGN AID

Vol. 1970.453]

treaty power and the power to declare war were the only divergences
from traditional principles in this regard. 65 It has been shown in Part
I how practice soon conformed the operation of the treaty
power-and probably the power to declare war as well-to more
traditional modes.
While the executive's capacity to respond with speed and dispatch
to crises may be at the root of its power, 6 it has been observed that its
specialized capacities for .negotiation and the day-to-day conduct of
foreign business, as well as its knowledge and familiarity with the
dynamics of world problems, have also brought a broad range of
affairs within its exclusive powers. The President now occupies the
center of the Nation's foreign affairs, a fact made inevitable by the
exercise of his initiative. To give the Congress a greater role at the
center is to run the risk of introducing a second main focus, further
diluting an executive machinery which already may have too many
foci. Thus today, according to Senator Fulbright, "the only source of
effective foreign policy under our system is presidential power."'267
Congressional control by statute merely serves to underline and to
magnify these deficiencies. Statutes lacking the flexibility required in
the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs may introduce rigidities and
constraints. Locke deemed them inappropriate: "[The federative
power (the executive power over foreign affairs)] is much less capable
to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the [normal]
executive [power] and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and
wisdom [of the executive]." '26 Furthermore, legislation may well
dictate a result inconsistent with the necessities imposed upon the
Nation by the international order. That any legislative solution is ever
exactly correct is unlikely. Finally, the situation can change quickly
from that in existence at the time the legislation was passed, and it
may prove difficult or impossible to repeal or modify the legislation to
265. See note I IIsupra and accompanying tet.

266. "'The degree of crisis and amount of time available for decisions have customarily
determined the scope of the president's substantive powers in the.field of foreign affairs.

Mathews 375; cf.Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 601-02 (1952).
267. Fulbright, 20th Century 2.

268. J.LOCKE,

SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §

Lord Bryce wrote that "foreign affairs.

. .

144 (MacMillan ed. 1956).

cannot be brought within the scope of statutes...

[they] cannot be provided for beforehand by laws general in application, but minutely particular
in wording:' I L. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 224 (3d ed. 1906). See also G.
KENNAN, MEMOIRS: 1925-50 at 409 (1967). We will see that the degree of rigidity can vary and
that some of the restrictions on the foreign aid program may, by their terms, be waivable or
subject to liberal construction.
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accommodate the new situation. For example, section 620() of the
Foreign Assistance Act [FAA] as amended in 1967,61 which barred
aid to Indonesia, may have delayed resumption of foreign aid to that
country longer than was wisePO
The peculiar inadequacies of the committee system for purposes of
foreign affairs have already been reviewed.2 1 Most legislation,
including restrictions on foreign aid, in fact originates in committee,
and much remains unchanged on the floor out of deference to the
committee, its chairman, or other sponsors of the' legislation with
the expectation that other proposed legislation will be likewise
respectedY 2 The influence of single individuals, not always known for
their particular wisdom in foreign affairs, can be disproportionate
under such a system. Senator McCarran's and Representative
Walters' influence on the immigration legislation bearing their name
is one example. And, George Ball has suggested that some of the
legislative restrictions on the aid program are merely "Mr. Passman's
views become law."2T3
Above all, the inappropriateness of legislative restrictions upon
the President in foreign, as distinguished from domestic, affairs
becomes apparent when one recollects: (1) Locke's distinction
between a domestic society governed, and governable, by laws and an
international realm in a "state of nature"; and (2) Congress'
responsiveness to the dynamics of domestic politics, as opposed to its
only tangential familiarity with foreign affairs.
IndividualRights, Democratic Control,and CongressionalExpertise
Where individuals' rights are involved, the courts have frequently
" ' Where such
recognized Congress' power to apply its expertise.27
269. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2407 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FAA].

270. FAA § 620() was in fact waivableby the President.
271. See notes 251-57 supra and accompanying text.
272. D. MORROW. supra note 255.

273. G. BALL, supra note 258, at 36.
274. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967) (expropriation;

Sabbatino Amendment); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (passports); Valentine v. United
States, 299 US. 5 (1936) (extradition power based on treaty or legislation); La Abra Silver
Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899) (claims); United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S.
677 (1892). See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), arising out of
the Korean War, World War I!cases such as Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Civil War cases such as ExparteMilligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wail.) 2 (1866) and ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Mid. 1861).
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rights are not so immediately involved, or the factors discussed above
are deemed to outweigh any possible impact on individual rights,
Congress may lack "power." This is the case with respect.to the core

area, where in the vast majority of cases government activity takes
place at the level of the public order, involving the relationship of the

executive and Congress, rather than the private order of private rights.
This distinction between the problems of the public order and the

'private order has been recognized by the courts. Thus, in Marbury v.
Madison2 5 it was noted that "[the] president is invested with certain
important political powers ....
They respect the nation, not
individual rights . . . . The application of this remark will be
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the
' Judge Fahy in Shachiman v.
department of foreign affairs." 276

Dulles

recognized the distinction when he remarked that "the right

of a particular individual to travel [was] involved and not a question
of foreign affairs on a political level."z s
The non-application of the doctrine of separation of powers to the

core area follows from the purpose of that doctrine-the protection of
individual liberties. As enunciated by Justice Brandeis, "[tihe

doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of

arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by
But cf. Derecktor v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 136, appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 802 (1955)
(foreign policy over contract rights); United States v. Caltex (Philippines) Inc., 344 U.S. 149
(1952); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (Commander-in-Chief powers over rights of enemy
belligerent). See also Leigh & Atkeson, Due Processin the Emerging ForeignRelations Law oJ
the United States, 21 Bus. LAW. 853, 22 Bus. LAW. 3 (1966); Miller, The American
Corporation in American Foreign Trade: A Case of Ill-Defined Private Rights and Unrefined
Public Power, 70 DICK. L. REv. 480 (1966); Scharpf, infra note 381, at 578 n.218; Timberg,
Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the Individual in International
Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REv. 159 (1965).
275. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
276. Id. at 165-66.
277. 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
278. Id. at 944. An analogy is to be found with respect to treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, dealing with the making of treaties, concerns the public order question ofwhen a treaty will
be effective within the United States. On the other hand, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which
declares treaties to be "the supreme law of the land," and which thus governs the relationship of
treaties and individual or private rights, concerns at least in part the private order; cf.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS §§ 140-41. This dichotomy is clearer in the United
Kingdom where the executive makes treaties, which are effective to bind the government as a
matter of constitutional law, but Parliament must pass a law and give them "'domestic" effect
if they are to affectprivate British rights. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS 415,502-05 (1968) [hereinafter cited as STEINER & VAGTS].
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means of inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among three departments to save the people
from autocracy." ' 9 At least one member of the Supreme Court has
acknowledged this non-application of the separation of powers
doctrine to foreign affairs: "inour intercourse with . . .[foreign
nations] .. .even the internal adjustment of federal power, with its
complex system of checks and balances, are unknown .

...

"I"

However, even in the core area, presumably the executive is subject to
the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Constitution protective
of individual rightss t
Where it is not the rights of particular individuals that may be
involved, but the collective rights of all or many citizens, the doctrine
of the separation of powers applies in order to ensure a more
democratic control. The power of Congress to declare war, although
somewhat atrophied in practice, 2 can be understood in these terms.
Here, significantly, the full Congress rather than any committee will
be principally involved. This involves the kind of general8 3 decision in
which the Congress is more qualified to participate28 than it is in
decisions concerning the core area.
The general authority to withhold appropriations is another
example of the application of the separation of powers to foreign
279. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion); cf C.
. . is a tranquility of mind.
. ..In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man
need not be afraid of another. . . when the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty." Id. at 28 1.See also
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1949). "Political liberty.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (I. Madison).

280. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 85 (1890) (dissenting opinion). Conversely, in the domestic
sphere, individual rights will normally be involved in the exercise of government power and the
separation of powers therefore applies. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
US. 579 (1952).
281. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 US. 258 (1849); cf United
States v.Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936).
282. See notes 110-17 supra and accompanying text (Part I).
283. See notes 189-90 supra and accompanying text (Part I).
284. Senator Fulbright has acknowledged that the Senate as a practical matter is very poorly
equipped to deal with day-to-day policy-making oi to try to outguess the President in this field.
On the other hand he believes "the Senate 'is very well equipped to deal with the longer-range,
more basic questions' of foreign policy," and believes the Senate and House can "cortie up with
ideas on the periphery of foreign affairs" which the executive will miss. Kenworthy, The
Fulbright Idea of Foreign Policy, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), at 74. Roger
Hilsman has propounded a thesis of how national consensus is developed with respect to long
term foreign policy issues, into which this concept of the Senate's function might well fit. See
Hilsman, Congressional-Executive Relations.
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affairs. As we have seen, the precise extent of this power is not fully
delimited, although it is exercised to limit the overall level of
government expenditure and to prevent waste and.promote
economy m in order to limit taxes, a general public interest. Professor
Bickel has indicated that, as a practical matter, because of the vast
volume of executive activity which was "undoubtedly foreseen,
Congress is forced to consider the purposes of appropriations in fairly
by-and-large fashion. Congress normally exercises, therefore, a
general policy control. .

..

Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce, following the
earlier precedent of the House of CommonsP can be explained in
terms of the individual interests involved and its proximity to
domestic dynamics. Significantly, where international dynamics
become involved, congressional power may, as has been
demonstrated, yield to executive. '
The rationale for Senate participation in the treaty power is not so
clearly that of democratic control. Indeed, the history of the
constitutional provision suggests that the Senate may have been given
a role in order to protect states' rights, although the locus of the treaty
power shifted throughout the Constitutional Convention. At one
point the Senate was to make treaties by itself. The final two-thirds
Senate vote requirement for ratification was in fact contrived to
protect certain regional interests.?" It may be this history which
explains the increasing shift to executive agreements, at least the
9
more "democratic" congressionally-authorized variety?'
Congressional control over administrative detail can probably be
explained in terms of congressional expertise; this may not extend,
however, to such questions as the rank and size of embassies abroad,
or questions of unitary management. A similar explanation can be
offered with respect to financial detail. Congressional expertise and
Compare congressional powers over the military establishment, note

supra and

accompanying text (Part
286. See McGuire, Constitutional Control over Public Moneys, 2 FED. B. ASS'N

187

(1935).
287. Hearings,Separationof Powers246-67.
WRIGHT-FoREIGN

143.

See notes 145.48 supra and accompanying text (Part
Congress has also voluntarily
delegated authority over foreign commerce to the executive for reasons of practicality. Sayre,
The Constitutionalityof the TradeAgreements Act,
L. REV.
n.10
CHEEVER & H.

McDougal& Lans.

AMERICAN FOREIGN
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democratic control of the tax burden might be balanced against the
factors of executive expertise discussed above.
THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

The Marshall Plan, 2 and its immediate precedessor programs of
aid to Greece and Turkey, 3 represented a rather radical departure for
peacetime United States foreign policy. "Modern American foreign
policy began in Greece . . . in 1947 . . . .The Truman Doctrine
ended all U.S. aloofness in the internal affairs of nations in other
hemispheres. Greece set the tombstone on isolationism.""'
Although one authority has written that "[m]ost observers...
agree that, without the Marshall Plan, Europe would have fallen into
economic and political chaos.
.",291 that Plan and successor aid
programs have always been surrounded by controversy. 296 The
dependence of the executive on the Congress for large amounts of
money 2 7 for the foreign aid program undoubtedly increased the
practical power of the Congress over this aspect of foreign affairs and
possibly over its conduct generally. One commentator has
stated that "the impact of the spending power on United States
post-war foreign policy has changed the relationship between the
President and the Congress in the foreign affairs field. The result has
292. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch. 169, 62 Stat. 137.
293. The so-called Truman Plan, Act of May 22, 1947, ch. 81,61 Stat. 103.
294. Sulzberger, ForeignAffairs: Where It All Began. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1968, at 46, col.
5.
295. Montgomery, The PoliticalDecay of Foreign Aid. 57 YALE REvIEw 6 (1967). Senator
Fulbright once called "the Mutual [Security] Program" "one of the keystones of our foreign
policy." Fulbright, 20th Century 4.
296. E. MASON, FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY (1964). One mark of this has been the
continued changes of format, concept, and administration for the program, a process that has
not ended yet. Thus the program or administrating agency have been at one time or another in
roughly chronological order: Economic Cooperation Administration, Point IV Program,
Mutual Security Administration, Foreign Operations Administration, International
Cooperation Administration, Development Loan Fund, and Agency for International
Development. In May, 1969, President Nixon, while proposing to continue AID, proposed yet
another vehicle--the Overseas Private Investment Corporation which he has now established. 83
Stat. 809-18, Pub. L. No. 91-175, §§ 237-40 (Dec. 30, 1969). The continued talk of
multilateralization of aid also reflects, in a sense, an effort to change the program's format and
administration.
297. For example, economic assistance for the period 1949-52 was S19,541 million. Hearings
on S. 2347 Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignAffairs. 91st Cong., IstSess. 243-44 (1969).
Cf note 303 infra for more recent levels.
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been to lessen the significance of the treaty power and the President's
possession of the diplomatic powers."' 98

With the successful conclusion of its aid programs in Europe, the
United States' foreign aid program has shifted almost exclusively to
the emerging, less developed countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle

East, and Latin America. 29 The Marshall Plan was intended to
rebuild European economies, counter the Soviets, and enhance

America's security. Our aid to underdeveloped countries is similarly
based on the notion that the internal development of the society and
economy of such countries will ultimately contribute to their and the
world's stability and, of course, to our own." One would have supposed that our policy of promoting long term stability through the in-

ternal development of the nations of the world might be distinguished
at least conceptually from the more immediate tasks of keeping in-

ternal and external peace. Yet, our seemingly sensible long term
economic and social policy has, in the minds of some, become oddly

linked with our military misfortune in Vietnam3 0' and it must be
recognized that while the development needs of the less developed
298. Note, The UnitedStates Congress and Development ofForeign Policy, 2 INT. L.Q. 658
(1948). Because of the House of Representative's initiative in tax and revenue matters, another
consequence has been some increase in its role in foreign affairs relative to the Senate. The
Marshall Plan has also been credited with another innovation, the emergence of bipartisanship
in foreign affairs. "Political partisanship was wiped out during the Congressional debates on the
Administration's Marshall Plan proposals." Id.
299. AI D, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1969 at 28-41 (1970).
300. Thus, Robert McNamara has written of our interests in Asia:
We have therefore a vital strategic interest in [the nations of the western Pacific], an
interest we cannot ignore. . . .Our role in this process [of efforts applied to the growth
of political, economic, and military strength] will be particularly important. American
policy toward Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific area must blend concern and
restraint as all help the East Asian nations to build among themselves the true security
that flows from economic and social progress. R. MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF
SECURITY 22-23 (1968).
301. See. e.g.. Senator Fulbright's statement: "One example, among other reasons given, for
justifying the intervention in Vietnam was the fact that we had foreign aid programs there, and
from this [the executive] seemed to deduce certain authority to intervene militarily." Hearings
on S. Res. 151 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations. 90th Cong., 1stSess. 42 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]. Senator Fulbright was encouraged by statements such as
the following by Secretary of State Rusk, "'Weare committed to assist South Vietnam ... [for
many reasons including] the aid approved by bipartisan majorities [of Congress] .
Id. at
119.
302. See generally COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (PEARSON COMMISSION),
PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT (1969).
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countries become more urgent0 2 foreign aid has sunk to a relatively
low national priority at this time 0 3 Nevertheless, our foreign aid has
meant a great deal to its recipients and is an important factor in
their countries' political life. As Robert F. Kennedy once observed,
"In some countries of the world, the most powerful single voice is
that of the AID administrator, with the Ambassador . . . having

relatively little power.' "4
The principal legislation presently governing the foreign aid
program is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended ° It
purports to give the President authorization to conduct the various
programs;, 05 prescribes operating standards, criteria, and procedures;
303. The appropriations figures over the last few years tell the story:

Fiscal
Year

Foreign Economic
Aid Appropriations
(In Billions)

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

S 2.314
2.603
2.000
2.195
2.048
2.144
1.895
1.380

Foreign aid "in effect, got caught in the backlash of the war in Vietnam." N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 1969, at 27, col. 7 (city edition) (speaking of appropriations for the International
Development Association, an affiliate of the I BRD).
304. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 114 (1969). Then Undersecretary of State Richardson
stated, in speaking of our foreign aid, that "Economic development represents our single
strongest tie to the developing nations... :'N.Y. Times, June 10, 1969, at 7,col. 1.
305. 22 U.S.C. § 2151 el seq. (1964). Other relevant legislation includes the Foreign
Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 84 Stat. 5 (1970) [hereinafter referred to
as 1970 Appropriations Act or FAAA]; and the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. IV, 1968) [hereinafter referred to
as P.L. 480]. See also The Peace Corps Act, as amended. 22 U.S.C. § 2501 (1964); cf ExportImport Bank Act of 1954, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1964); the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 195 1, as amended,22 U.S.C. § 1611 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the Battle
Act]. The full text of these acts, and other relevant legislation, is available in STAFF OF THE
SENATE

COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN

RELATIONS AND

HOUSE COMM.

ON

FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1970).
306. American foreign economic assistance has consisted of a number of different programs.
These have included large scale commodity assistance on a grant basis, e.g., Mutual Security
Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 832, repealed 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1964) [hereinafter cited as MSA], and
now on a loan basis, FAA § 201; development loans for capital projects, e.g.. FAA § 201;
technical assistance, FAA § 211; local currency loans and grants, P.L. 480, § 104; several
kinds of guarantees of United States investments, FAA § 221; and supporting assistance,
FAA § 401. There are also programs of military assistance with which this article is not
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contains administrative provisions; and includes many of the

restrictionsPe? on the President's discretion which are the subject of
this article? °s
THE APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS

ForeignA id Within the Independent Powersof the President

Although this article has focused on the President's exclusive
powers rather than his merely independent ones, it seems clear that
many aid decisions relating to the existence, content, and conduct of
our relations with foreign countries fall within the President's
independent powers? °9 The decision to initiate aid to one or more
primarily concerned. See, e.g., FAA § 501-24. It should be recognized, however, that the line
between economic and military assistance has not always been crystal clear. Economic
assistance has often been given to strengthen a country in many ways, including militarily. See
former 'defense support" which was provided under Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.
MSA §§ 131-32; cf. FAA § 401 (supporting assistance provided to "support or promote
economic or political stability"):So, too, military assistance can be used to promote economic
development. FAA § 502 (civic action).
307. While the executive has not publicly resisted such restrictions on constitutional grounds,
it has, of course, pleaded for flexibility on practical grounds, both with respect to technical and
political restrictions. MORROW, supra note 255, at 35-37. And the Congress has to a
considerable extent left the President flexibility through waivers in the "national security
interest" (FAA § 620(d)); through modifying proposed mandatory provisions into more
loosely worded ones (FAA § 620(o)); through sense of Congress provisions (former "mob
action" provision, text accompanying note 331 infra); and through dropping others entirely
(partition of Ireland, note 332 infra). Jt may be that it has done so, not only in response to
executive pleas for flexibility on practical grounds, but because it sensed the possibility of
"constitutional" problems. Cf House Report No. 818, note 329 infra, at 166; 108 CoNG. REt:
13153-54 (1962) (Congressman Judd regarding FAA § 620(e)).
308. The several classes of provisions in the FAA and other foreign aid legislation are
discussed in Wilkins, Legal Norms and InternationalEconomic Development: The Case of the
55 CALIF. L. Rev. 977
Cuba Shipping Restriction in the UnitedStates ForeignAssistance A ct,
(1967).
Has all this legislation been "necessary," as a constitutional matter? Certainly much of it
deals with administrative detail, including operating procedures and personnel matters, on which
Congress has legislated for other foreign affairs agencies including the Department of State. As
a practical matter, substantial appropriations might not have been available without substantial
legislation. It was apparently also believed that substantial legislative involvement with the
substantive aspects of the program would enable it to acquire "deeper roots and possess greater
stability than one formulated solely by the President and the State Department." See 2 INT.
L.Q., supra note 298, at 659. Notwithstanding these practical factors it would seem that to the
extent that the program and its conduct is based on the independent foreign affairs powers of the
President, the legislation is technically "unnecessary."
309. Senator Fulbright has in fact assumed that much of foreign aid falls within the
traditional core area.. Hearings,Separation of Powers 44.
Presumably aspects of other post World War II activities, for example, intelligence,
information, disarmament, atomic energy exchanges, military sales, surplus agricultural sales,
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countries would seem to be such a decision? 0 The fact that Congress
can withhold appropriations and frustrate the executive decision is
little different from Congress' power to frustrate the treaty power
by the withholding of appropriations.0 ' Similarly, Congress can, in
theory, withhold all appropriations to the State Department and

effectively curtail our foreign relations."' but this does not mean that
the President has no independent foreign affairs powers?'

3

Exclusive Powers of the President

The restrictions in present and past foreign aid legislation fall into
several classes.
a) Directions-to the President. Just as Congress may not direct

the President to exercise his powers within the traditional core area,3"
so it would seem that it may not do so with respect to powers within
the "new" core area of foreign aid. In 1950 the Congress sought in the
Omnibus Funds Bill3 '5 to direct the President to make a loan of $62.5
trade, cultural exchanges, possibly tax, antitrust, export control, and the operations of the
Export Import Bank may fall within such independent powers.
310. The Marshall Plan was an executive initiative. G. KENNAN, supra note 268, at 326.
311. Consider, for example, the executive's difficulties over U.N. contributions. Nobleman,
FinancialAspects of CongressionalParticationin Foreign Relations.289 ANNALs AM. ACAD.
POL. &SOCIAL SCI. 145, 163 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Nobleman].
312. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text (Part I).
313. Professor Bartlett would therefore seem in error in the following testimony:
I remember an instance not long ago, not in the present Administration, in which the
President was asking the Congress for appropriation of money for foreign aid, and he
said at his press conference that he would not be able to carry out the foreign policy of the
United States unless Congress appropriated the amount that he had asked for for foreign
aid. I think this is a fine example of this sort of a problem, because I would suggest that if
the President asks for, say, $1million for foreign aid to a given country, and the Congress
is not convinced that this is right and therefore does not appropriate the money, then it is
not the foreign policy of the United States to give that country SI million. This is the crux
of the matter. It does not become the foreign policy of the United States simply by the
presidential edict. 1967 Hearings24.
The Congress has entertained similar conceits with respect to more traditional areas. Thus, in
1867, after a treaty had been concluded for the purchase of Alaska, the Congress sought to
amend the appropriation and implementing legislation to read, "that the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President and Senate to enter into treaties with foreign governments do not
include the power to complete the purchase of territory before the necessary appropriations shall
be made therefor by act of Congress.
...
Nobleman 152. The amendment was defeated by
two votes.

314. One provision of the FAA seems to attempt just that. FAA § 601(b)(2) provides that
"the President shall . . . accelerate a program of negotiating treaties for commerce and trade,
including tax treaties, which shall include provisions to encourage and facilitate the flow of
private investment .... This seems improper.
315. Act of Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, 64 Stat. 595.
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million to Spain. President Truman chose to treat the direction as an
authorization: "I . . . feel obliged to comment upon the provision of

the bill which authorizes loans for the purpose of assistance to Spain.
I do not regard this provision as a directive, which would be
unconstitutional, but instead as an authorization, in addition to the
authority already in existence under which loans to Spain may be
36
made."
b) Congressional and Committee Vetoes. The executive has
chosen to challenge restrictions on foreign aid on much the same
grounds as those in domestic legislation. Thus, President Johnson, in
signing the 1964 amendment to P.L. 480, chose to treat, as "report
and wait" requirements, two "committee veto" provisions. One
provided that all local currency grants were subject to disapproval of
the agriculture committees within 30 and, in some cases, 60 days of
transmission, and the other required the approval, by a committee
partly composed of Congressmen, of local currency loans made at
interest rates below the cost of funds to the Treasury. He stated:
In recent years four Attorneys General of the United States have held that
legislative provisions vesting in congressional committees the power to approve

or disapprove actions of the executive branch are unconstitutional. The Acting
Attorney General now advises me that a provision vesting such power in a

committee made up in part of Members of Congress stands on no better
footing. Both such provisions represent a clear violation of the constitutional

principle of separation of powers. This is the position taken in similar cases by
President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and by myselff'

President Kennedy had earlier instructed the Administrator of AID
that a requirement that deobligated funds only be reobligated if there
were no disapproval within 60 days by Congress and the
appropriations committees was
unconstitutional either as a delegation to Congressional committees of powers

which reside only in the Congress as a whole or as an attempt to confer
executive powers on the committees in violation of the principle of separation
of powers prescribed in Articles I and I1 of the Constitution. Previous
316. The President continued, "Spain is not, and has not been, foreclosed from borrowing
money from this Government. Money will be loaned to Spain whenever mutually advantageous
arrangements can be made with respect to security, terms of repayment, purposes for which the
money is to be spent, and other appropriate factors and whenever such loans will serve the
interest of the United States in the conduct of foreign relations." Nobleman 160.
317. He continued: "However, I appreciate the desire of the Congress to be informed and to
be consulted on the operation of all aspects of the Public Law 480 program, and I am directing
that executive officials see that this is done." 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON, 1963-1964 at 1250 (1965).
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Presidents and Attorneys General have objected to similar provisions
permitting a committee to veto executive action authorized by law.31 8

More recently there has been included in the appropriations act a
provision that "no part of this appropriation [for technical
assistance] shall be used to initiate any project or activity which has
not been justified to Congress .. .."I" A similar provision exists
with respect to international organizations and supporting
assistance.3 0 During fiscal year 1968 AID treated "justify" as a
"report and wait" requirement. However, the House appropriations
subcommittee indicated that this was a "committee veto" type
provision, and it has in fact disapproved certain projects3 2
In 1961, then Assistant Attorney General Katzenbach suggested,
but only within the executive branch and not publicly, that a veto
device on foreign aid might be especially improper because foreign
affairs were involved. The provision concerned was a proposed
amendment by Senator Dirksen to section 201, S. 1983, which,
although waivable, would, inter alia, have given Congress the power
by concurrent resolution to bar particular loans of over $5,000,0007 n
Mr. Katzenbach wrote Theodore Tannenwald, then SIecial Assistant
to the Secretary of State, on August 23, 1961, that "the clause may
well be thought to violate the doctrine of the separation of powers
insofar as it interferes with executive authority. This difficulty is the
more serious where the authority has an independknt constitutional
318. He continued.
I concur in these views. However, I consider it entirely prooet for the committees to
request information with respect to plans for the expenditures of appropriated funds, and
I recognize the desirability of consultations between officials of the executive branch and
the committees. It is therefore my intention, acting on the advice of the Department of
Justice, to treat this provision as a request for information. You are therefore requested
to keep the appropriations committees fully informed of any reobligation of prior year
funds. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963 at 6 (1964). See
Chayes, A Common Lawyer Looks at InternationalLaw, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1404
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Chayes].
319. See FAAA, Title I, Economic Assistance, cl.
i.
320. Id. cls. I &7.
321. The fact that AID" has acquiesced in this, in contrast to the rather consistent executive
objection to such devices in domestic and other AID cases, suggests the current weakness of the
foreign aid program within the Congress.
322. Senator Gore had stated of this proposal, which was eventually defeated: "A
determination upon a given development loan which may not involve many policy questions is in
fact an executive function. Should Congress undertake to exercise veto power over a particular
loan, it would, it seems to me, be undertaking to that extent to partake of the executive function
- 107 CONG. REr 15232 (1961).
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basis found in the exclusive presidential power to conduct foreign
''
relations. s
c) Executive Secrecy. As already noted, executive secrecy may
be equally applicable to domestic and foreign affairs, but it has been
especially asserted with respect to the latter. Section 624(d)(7) of the
Foreign Assistance Act3 2 requires the delivery of certain documents
and information to certain committees of Congress or the General
Accounting Office. Upon failure to do so, disbursements to the
Inspector General for Foreign Assistance-an official in the State
Department-are to cease, although the-President may "personally"
waive this. For fiscal year 1960, section 533A(d) of the Mutual
Security Act,121 a predecessor, did not contain this waiver authority.
When President Eisenhower refused to deliver certain documents to
the House Appropriations Subcommittee, notwithstanding the
absence of a waiver authority, and directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to pay the Inspector General, the issue was joined. The
Attorney General gave an opinion32 in which he sought to avoid the
constitutional issue. But he went on to say that if the issue could not
be avoided, it was his opinion that the section in question was "plainly
invalid" and "unconstitutional. ' '3 21 The Attorney General implied
that the involvement of foreign affairs reinforced the President's
right2 Senator Robertson, in explaining a proposed but unsuccessful
323. Letter from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Theodore Tannenwald, Aug. 23, 1961 (copy in
author's possession); cf. FAA § 617, which permits Congress by concurrent resolution, to

terminate "lalssistance under any provision" of the FAA. This presumably includes the entire
program, or aid to any particular country. Mr. Katzenbach also challenged this provision in
1961 in his letter to Mr. Tannenwald, although it has been the law since 1948:
The reasoning behind Professor Corwin's argument that delegated powers may be
conditioned as the Congress sees fit may not apply to the instant provision. As is pointed
out below, we are here dealing with situations in which the President has specific
Constitutional powers of his own. The possibility that the concurrent resolution device

might be used to intrude upon the Presidential power to conduct foreign relations may
distinguish this situation from others.
Senator Javits has said of concurrent resolutions:
Use of this device to compel Executive action or to provide for Congressional

participation in the details of Executive administration of Congressionally granted
authority would raise very grave constitutional doubts indeed, since they could well be
construed as invasions of the Executive powers of the President. (He goes on to say
that § 617 does not raise this problem). 107 CONG. REC. 13989 (1961).
324. FAA § 624(d)(7).
325. MSA § 533(A)(d).
326. 41 Op. Arr'y GEN. 507 (1960).
327. Id. at 530.
328. Id. at 519-20.
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amendment to the above statutory provision which would have
permitted the President to'withhold information in certain
circumstances, stated: "Ifthe President, in keeping with the wellestablished principle under the Constitution of the right of the
President to handle foreign policy, decides that the disclosure of some
phase of foreign policy would be against the public interest, he can so
certify, and the Congress will not be able to get the information."3 '
The matter was in fact resolved and the confrontation ended with the
inauguration of President Kennedy, who instructed the documents to
be shown to the subcommittee chairman but not its members, which
apparently was satisfactory to the chairman?3 °
-d) Pressure on the Traditional Core Area. We have seen that
conditions on appropriations that put pressure on the executive with
respect to the traditional core by the threat of withholding
appropriations for the conduct of such core are improper. l It would
seem equally clear that such pressure on the traditional core, by threat
of withholding appropriations for the conduct of aid, is also improper. Thus, a requirement that the President terminate our diplomatic
relations with Russia, or India, or South Vietnam, as a condition of
the availability of any aid appropriation, presumably would be
improper. In 1950, the House in fact passed an amendment which was
dropped in conference that would have terminated assistance to the
United Kingdom until Ireland cedlsed to be partitioned.3 2 Certainly
this would have put pressure on the President's recognition power.
A few current provisions come close to applying such pressure.
Section 620(t) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides that no aid may
be furnished to a country with whom diplomatic relations are severed
until such relations are resumed. Although it is doubtful that aid
would be furnished to a country with which the United States did not
have diplomatic relations, an exception might be emergency relief,
and section 639 of the Act in fact permits this.m Section 620(i), which
329.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION

FROM FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, H..R. REP.

No. 818, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess. 165

(1961).

330. Chayes 1403. A similar provision in the Mutual Security and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1961, 74 Stat. 776, § 101(d), called for the termination of aid to a
country where documents with respect to it were not delivered. H.R. REP. No. 818, supra note
329, at 166.
331. See notes 149-215 supra and accompanying text (Part I).
332. Thorp, supra note 235. at 209.
333. FAA § 639.
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bars assistance to "aggressors,"m and section 620(j), which suggests

that the President consider terminating assistance to a country which
permits or fails to prevent mob action against "United States

property, ' " may be considered as putting pressure on some rather
traditional core area decisions-recognition of belligerency and
making of protests.
e) Pressure on the Traditionaland New Core Areas. FAA
section 620(e)(1), the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment,. 6 puts

pressure on both the traditional and new core areas. It provides, in
essence, that aid be suspended to any government when that govern-

ment or a subdivision thereof has expropriated an American national's property and has not taken appropriate steps towards compen-

sation within six months of the taking. The effect of this section,
which has been called a "serious encumbrance on the formulation of
effective foreign policy."-"7 is to put pressure on the executive to
espouse a claim-an invasion of the traditional core area-or, in the
alternative, to require the suspension of aid-an invasion of the new
core area. This latter can be more deleterious to our relations than
a failure to ever commence aid, especially because of the manner in

which this section may be brought to bear to settle a contractual or
commercial dispute over which there may be genuine differences of

view. Although Ambassadors often make plain that they are under
congressional compulsion and that 620(e)(1) may not be waived,
local governments are often incredulous at this.P Certainly, in to-

day's world the termination of aid can have greater significance than
the suspension of diplomatic relations or the formulation of a

treaty. '
334. FAA § 620(i).
335. FAA § 6206j).
336. See note 4 supra and accompanying text (Part 1).FAA § 620(e)(I) is to be
distinguished from FAA § 620(e)(2), the so-called Sabbatino Amendment, sometimes also
referred to as the Hickenlooper Amendment, which was enacted to alter the result in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), involving the application of the "act of
state" doctrine;, compare P.L. 480, § 410, and Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. § 1158 (c) (Supp.
IV, 1969), both of which contain provisions similar to FAA § 620(e)(1).
337. 'Transition" memorandum prepared for President-elect Nixon, December 1968. (copy
in possession of author).
338. See Ceylon Daily News, Feb. II, 1963, at 6, col. I, for the reaction of the Ceylonese
government to the threat of suspension of U.S. aid. Cf FAA § 620(c), which may be waived,
barring assistance to any government "indebted" to an American for goods and services.
The State Department had traditionally avoided the assertion of contract claims.
RESTATEMENT

§ 212, Reporters' Note,

STEINER & VAGTS

415. This is possibly a result of the

difficulties involved in the resolution of these claims. Jennings. State Contracts in International
Law. 37 BYIL 156 (1960).
339. The termination of our aid to, for example, Peru, Brazil, or Argentina, would certainly
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The origins o the 1963 Hickenlooper Amendment have been
traced.4 0 It was pushed very hard by an American company whose
property had been expropriated by the Brazilian state of Rio Grande
do Sul. While by its terms it cannot be waived, it is not clear how
seriously the executive takes it, although the provision has now been
applied, or its application threatened, in many other countries u4
Former Deputy Legal Advisor Lowenfeld remarked in 1967 that "it
would be very difficult to establish or maintain an Alliance for
Progress if every investment dispute, large or small, threatened to
terminate the aid program for an entire country."3 2 He seemed to
conclude that the executive must therefore apply a "loose non-rule"
to these matters, although recognizing "Congress has opted against"
this. 3 Possibly it is regarded as an unconstitutional congressionalfait
accompli. Its unconstitutionality has not, however, been asserted by
the executive.3 FAA section 620(e)(1) is, perhaps, one of the
be of significance to our continuing relations with them. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1968, ht
25, col. 1 (city edition) ("Peru Aide Warns U.S. on Pressuie"); cf.President Kennedy's remarks
about this section when it was first proposed:
Nobody has ever questioned the right of any government to seize property, providing
the compensation is fair.
The United States is involved with the Brazilian Government in attempting to adjust
this matter. I can think of nothing more unwise than to attempt to pass a resolution at
this time which puts us in a position not of disagreement with a governor of a state who is
not particularly our friend, but instead, really, with the whole Brazilian nation, which is
vital and which is a key and with which we must have the closest relations ...
And I must say that if you look at the map and realize the vitality of Brazil--I think
that we ought to keep a sense of proportion.
We don't want to make those who dislike us work easy by reacting to things which
happen in a way which strengthen[s] them and weakens the influence of the United
States. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1962, at 14, col. 8.
340. Lillich, The Protectionof ForeignInvestment andthe ForeignAssitanceAct of1962, 17
RUTGERS L. REv. 405 (1963). Cf.STINER &VAGTS 358.
341. The non-waivability ofthe section reflects the view of many American investors that the
executive's espousal of their expropriation blaims in the past has often not been as vigorous as
they believed warranted. Although non-waivable, Secretary of State Rusk indicated that the
executive could live with FAA § 620(e)(1). Lillich, The Protectionof Foreign Investment and
the HickenlooperAmendment, 112 U. PA. L. R v. 1116,1127 (1964).
Countries where the section has been applied, or its application threatened, include Argentina,
Ceylon, Guinea, Iran, and Peru.
342. Lowenfeld, DiplomaticIntervention in Investment Disputes, 1967 AM. Soc. INT. LAW
PROCEEDINGS 96, 98.

343. Id. at 102.
344. The question of the constitutionality of § 620(e)(1) is touched on in Comment,
Argentina and the HickenlooperAmendment, 54 CALIF. L. Rev. 2078 (1966).
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"regrettable congressional incursions" to which Senator Fulbright

has referred.s
f)Pressure and Restrictions on the New Core Area. Section
620(e) is just one of a number of provisions which bar, require the
termination of, or otherwise inhibit the furnishing of aid to specified
countries or classes of countries. 6 Thus aid is wholly barred or
otherwise restricted to, among others, Cuba or a country which
assists Cuba, 7 unfriendly or Communist countries,. 5 the UAR, 349
aggressors, 350 countries seizing American fishing vessels in
international waters, 5 ' countries trading with or permitting ships
bearing their flag to trade with Cuba or North Vietnam352 and
countries trading in certain items with Bloc countriesPs
345. "These mandatory restrictions, it is true, impose a degree of rigidity on the Executive
and constitute a regrettable congressional incursion on matters of the day-to-day conduct of
policy." Hearings. Separation ofPowers 44.

346. The wording of the provisions vary. Some (1) bar the "provision" or "furnishing" of
aid (e.g., FAA §§ 620(a)(1), 620(f)); others (2) require the "suspension" or "termination" of
aid (e.g., FAA § 620(e)(1)). The overall effect will be the same, except that the latter may cut
off disbursement under existing obligations, e.g., loans, whereas the former may not. There are
other variations: some provisions bar aid to "countries," e.g.. FAA § 620(f); others to
"governments," e.g., FAA § 620(a); this can mean a difference. Also, the provisions may be of
varying mandatory quality. See note 375 infra.
347. FAA § 620(a).
348. E.g.. FAA §§ 201(b), 211 (a) (friendly countries), 620(b), 620(f).
349. FAA § 620(p) and FAAA § 117.
350. FAA § 620(i). See text following note 333 supra.
351. FAA § 620(o); cf § 5 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1971
(Supp. IV, 1969), amending 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-76 (1964).
352. FAA § 620(a)(3) and FAAA § 107, with respect to Cuba, and FAA § 620(n), and

FAAA § 116 with respect to Vietnam, have barred aid to the United Kingdom, Yugoslavia,
Cyprus, Malta, and Hong Kong. Transition memorandum, supra note 337. One authority had

this to say about the Vietnam provision:
Similar Congressional restrictions in other fields have had serious repercussions overseas.

The "trading with the enemy" clause in the recent foreign aid legislation provides that
the United States cannot offer assistance to any nation that trades with Cuba or North
Vietnam. On the surface, it appears entirely reasonable to refrain from aiding those who
aid your enemy, but unfortunately the law allows the President no discretion to make an
exception even when it is clearly in the national interest to do so. One result was that the
United States had to cut off its programs of "building bridges to the East" in Yugoslavia
because that country had sent medical supplies to North Vietnam. Normally medical
supplies are not considered contraband under international law; and their interdiction,
even is they were sometimes used for the treatment of military personnel, surely does not
advance American purpose very much. But it clearly injures the American position in
Eastern Europe and throughout the Communist world when, for a trivial reason, it is no
longer possible to encourage favorable developments in a nation that has already shown
other East European satellites how to defy Moscow, that has entered into a significant
dialogue with the West, and that has markedly turned toward entrepreneurial
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Based on an analogy to restrictions on the President's recognition
or diplomatic relations power, these provisions quite clearly seem
constitutionally infirm.-It has been indicated previously that aid
relations may count for more today than traditional diplomatic
ones.P To worsen the impropriety, some of these provisions also put
pressure on the traditional core area.
There are less drastic measures which can place pressure on the
new core area. Thus FAA section 620(h) requires the President to
adopt regulations, which he has done, which limit fairly severely" ' the
possibility of joint Communist Bloc-United States projects. Such a
restriction clearly limits the effectiveness of United States diplomacy
in less developed countries, and vis-a-vis the Bloc. To be sure, AI D
has learned to "live with" this restriction. It is just one example of
many, and AID might deny feeling any "pinch" on operations
because of it. The fact is that if the executive were left free to devise its
own policies, subject always to regard for congressional feelings, it
might have developed more effective ones.
g) Administrative Detail. As we have seen, both the executive
and Congress have expertise with respect to numerous aspects of
administrative detail. Thus ordinary personnel requirements5 may
very well be within the competence of the Congress. On the other
hand, as we approach external matters the executive power should
grow. Thus query whether FAA section 631 (a), which authorizes the
President to maintain special AID missions overseas, is
constitutionally "necessary." FAA section 631(d), which provides
that "wherever practicable . . . especially in the case of the smaller
programs" economic assistance shall be administered by the embassy
competition and even permitted a degree of political lieralism. It is ironic that one aid
project under consideration when the Congressional ban was announced was a $30
million wheat sale that would have helped finance economic reform (featuring
liberalization and decentralization) in Yugoslavia. Montgomery, supra note 295, at 11.
The unfortunate consequences of United States withdrawal from the Prck Thnot Dam project in
Cambodia in 1966 because of these provisions are described at id. at 1-5.
353. BattleAct; FAA §§ 107, 109& 116; P.L. 480 § 103(d).
354. See note 304 supra. A statement made to Congressman Derwinski by an American
ambassador that "modem diplomacy is 90 percent aid," seems an exaggeration. H.R. REP. No.
1587, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1968).
355. AID MANUAL ORDERS § 1018.9 (May 8, 1964).
356. E.g.. FAA § 625.
357. As first proposed, this requirement would have been mandatory for all programs of less
than one million dollars per annum. S. 1837, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1965). The
requirement was dropped by the conference committee. H. REP. No. 811, 89th Cong., IstSess.
23-24 (1965).
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staff, seems of questionable propriety 5 7 And early legislation, M
which specified that any difference between the Secretary of State and
the foreign aid administrator was to be resolved personally by the
President, thus in effect barring a Presidential delegation of this task
to the Secretary of State, may well have run afoul of the principles of
"unitary management."'
h) Financial Terms, Operating Procedures, and Procurement
Provisions. The issue here seems to be a balance of traditional
congressional competence and concern versus the degree of impact on
our external relations. Consider, for example, financial provisions
such as the substitution of loans for grants and minimum interest
rates on loansY0 These appear to be within more accepted
bounds of the appropriations power, but can certainly restrict the
executive in ways deleterious to aid relations. The terms of aid loans
can have a serious impact on, for example, India's debt burden, her
foreign exchange position, investment possibilities, and, hence, her
economic development s1 To illustrate, if Congress were to prescribe
a maximum 18 year term and minimum 6 percent interest, American
aid loans would probably be prohibitive and aid relations with India
seriously affected. Would it be unreasonable to say that while
Congress may withhold funds entirely, once it appropriates them they
must be free of such restrictions as this? While Congress can normally
prescribe operating procedures,362 should it be completely free to do so
if the same have a considerable impact on the effect of United States
aid programs abroad? 363 The burden which this might place on the
conduct of foreign affairs suggests that perhaps Congress should not
possess such freedom.

358. See Surrey, The Economic CooperationAct of 1948, 36

CALIF.

L. REv. 509 (1948); cf.

Jewell, supra note 153, at 121.
359. See note 105 supra (Part I).

360. The FAA has no provision concerning the maximum term of a loan, although forty
years is, as an administrative matter, AID's longest term. AID

MANUAL ORDER

§ 1052.1

(Oct. 9, 1968); cf. P.L. 480, § 106 (agricultural surplus dollar sales on maximum 20 year
credit).
361. See THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1969, at 50, cols. 2-3 (India: Aid Crisis Hinders Growth).
362. See note 104 supra and accompanying text (Part i).
363. See, e.g., FAA §§ 201(b), 211(a) (specifies criteria which President is to "take into
account" in making particular loans and grants); FAA § 611(a) (technical and financial
planning required before obligation of funds for certain purposes); FAA § 611(b),

FAAA § 101 (no water related project to be financed until certain Department of Interior costbenefit computations made); FAAA § 115 (requires President to issue regulations, which he

has done, to minimize use of non-American non-local nationals on construction jobs);
FAA §§ 221-24 (many technical and other limitations on investment guaranty programs).
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Possibly more controversial are provisions related to procurement
and, arguably, at least partly within the commerce powers of
Congress. These include the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act
of 193634 and FAA section 603 requiring 50 percent of all aid
commodities to be shipped on American vessels, and FAA section
604(a), pursuant to which the President has brought AID commodity
procurement to the point that it is 98 percent of United States
origin 65 It might well be thought that the President's exclusive
powers are applicable to some extent to these matters.
i) Categories, Line Items, and Other Niceties. The annual
appropriations and authorizations for foreign aid are divided into
categories such as development loans and technical assistance 6 In
The past the executive has on occasion ignored such categories in
military appropriations. Was this mere fait accompli or are such
restrictions improper? If the President could properly ignore such
restrictions, where would it stop? There must be some limit on the
President's freedom. Presumably, the Congress can properly decide
whether our aid will be on a bilateral rather than a multilateral
basis 67
The line item is troublesome. Thus, if it is accepted that the
prohibition of aid to certain countries is objectionable,368 Congress
might resort to line items and specify the countries which will receive
aid and, if it wished, amounts each will receive. Though largely
avoided in recent years, this approach had been resorted to in the
past' Arguably, such statutory specification should be deemed
beyond Congress' power. In effect the line item is a "nicety" which
should not be available if it in substance accomplishes what other
forms of control, which are clearly improper, may not.
364. FAA § 601(b),46 U.S.C. § 1241 (1964).
365. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ANNUAL

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FISCAL

YEAR 1968, at 19 (1969); 'cf United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393
U.S. 199,202 n.5 (1968).
Compare FAA § 620(d), which restricts assistance to productive enterprises whose output

may compete with U.S. enterprise and AID

MANUAL ORDER

§ 1016.1, which restricts aid to

textile plants which are thought to be competitivewith U.S. textile manufacturers.

366. FAA § 610 gives the President limited authority to transfer funds between categories.
367. Cf.FAA § 205 (10% of development loans may be transferred to the IBRD, IDAand
IFC); FAAA, Title 1, Economic Assistance, cl.11 (no funds may be used to carry out
FAA § 205).
368. See notes 331-53 supra and accompanying text.
369. Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, § 303(a), 22 U.S.C. § 1571(7) (1964),

specified amounts of aid for certain European countries and "general area of China."
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We have seen that Congress may not specify the rank of our
emissaries to other countries and, analogously, it seems inappropriate

that it should be able, within the total amount appropriated for aid, to
designate amounts for each recipient country. At the present time

legislation does not specify individual country "aid levels." To be
sure the annual executive presentation may indicate such amounts?07
But such "presentations" are not deemed legally binding, although

their flagrant violation may of course bring congressional retribution
in subsequent years. FAA section 620(u) and FAAA section 119 re-

quire the President to "withhold economic assistance in an amount
equivalent" to that spent on sophisticated weapons? 71 The exact op-

eration of such a requirement may be problematic.
Another set of provisions limits the number of countries to which
particular categories of aid may be provided.3 72 Professor
Montgomery wrote of the predecessors to these provisions: "Congress
has unilaterally declared its intention to rid the United States of the

burden of carrying the world on its shoulders. With no rationale other
than sheer discouragement, it voted in October 1966 to limit
development loans to only ten countries, supporting assistance to
thirteen, and technical assistance to forty. ' 73 These restrictions are
especially troublesome. It may very well be that the United States

should concentrate its aid efforts, and Congress can certainly play a
370. In fact AI D's budget presentation has been on an illustrative basis; it has not presented
all its actual proposed projects for each coming fiscal year for incorporation in the authorization
and appropriations legislation. It has not only resisted the specification of amounts for
particular project but for regions and counties as well.
371. FAA § 504(a); cf FAA 620(s), which calls for the termination of assistance to a
country whose military expenditures materially interfere with its development.
372. FAA § 201(b); cf. FAA § 211(a) (limits technical assistance recipients to 40
countries, with a $600,000 exception for "self-help" projects); FAA § 401 (limits supporting
assistance recipients to 12 countries); FAA § 504(a) (limits military assistance to 40
countries).
373. Professor Montgomery continued:
Fortunately, it also gave the President discretionary power to increase these numbers if he
found it in the national interest to do so; which, obviously, he would have to do since in
the previous years we had been offering aid to seventy-seven countries, none of which was
prepared to abandon its claims for assistance. In an effort to concentrate aid programs,
the United States now sends nearly 90 percent of its aid to twenty nations, and is
replacing bilateral arrangements where possible by regional efforts. Even so, Senator
Fulbright objected vigorously when the President found it in the national interest to
exceed the statutory limit of sixty-six countries. Montgomery, supra note 295, at 10; cf.
Hearings, Separation of Powers 44.
These sections are technically subject to the FAA § 614(a) waiver authority but it is unlikely it
will be used. As originally enacted these sections had express waiver authority, but this has now
been deleted.
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significant role in the development of consensus on this. But surely the
line as to the exact number of countries is for the executive. Who is to
say that development loan programs for twenty countries is not too
few? Could Congress reduce the number to five?3 '

It seems fair to conclude that those "niceties" which seek to
accomplish indirectly what the Congress cannot do directly are
forbidden "controls" and not mere extensions of the permitted power
to withhold appropriations. To hold that Congress is without these
"nice" powers is not to leave it helpless to check the executive.P
374. It might be argued that only the suddenness of a reduction to five, from say twenty,
would be objectionable. This article maintains that the limitation itself is bad. There are yet
other sorts of congressional restrictions. Thus, Congress has not refrained from seeking to
impose statutory limits on our executive's participation in international agencies. The InterAmerican Development Bank [IDBA], § 14(c), 22 U.S.C. § 2831(c) (Supp. !II, 1968),
requires the U.S. representative to vote against any Fund for Special Operations loans to a
country which is in violation of the Hicklenlooper Amendment, FAA § 620(e)(1), supra note
336; IDBA § 283m(c) contains a similar provision with respect to the so-called Symington
Amendment, FAA § 620(s). See Wilkins, supra note 308, at 986 n.35; cf. the attempt by the
House Banking and Currency Committee, on March 14, 1968, to direct the then U.S. executive
director of the IBRD, Livingston Merchant, to vote against a loan to Greece. Hearings on
World Bank Loan to NIBID of Greece Before the Sub comm. on InternationalFinanceof the
House Comm. on Banking andCurrency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
It is interesting to note that A I D, as an administrative matter, has always taken the position
that any AID funds channeled through international organizations pass free of most of the
restrictions of the aid legislation.
Cf.Congressional approaches to appropriations for U.N. contributions, supra note 311; P'.L.
84-885, § 5 (certain authority conferred on the Department of State is "not to be construed as
granting authority. . . to participate in the activities of any international organization for more
than one year without approval by the Congress"); FAA § 301(b) and FAAA, Title 1,
Economic Assistance, cl. 5 (President "shall seek to assure that no [U.S.] contribution to the
United Nations Development Program.

.

. shall be used for.

. .

the Government of Cuba, so

long as Cuba is governed by the Castro regime"); FAA § 301(c) ("No contributions. . .shall
be made [to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East] except on the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take all
possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contributions shall be used to
furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called
Palestine Liberation Army"). Cf. FAA § 620(u) (President shall take into account a country's
U.N. dues status in decision whether to provide aid).
375. For examples of such "checks" see notes 420-37 infra and accompanying text. It should
be noticed that not all restrictions are non-waivable; that is, by their terms they cannot be
waived by the President, and the general waiver provisions of FAA § 614(a) do not apply to
them. Non-waivable provisions include, however, FAA § 620(e)(1); FAA § 620(i), text after
note 333 supra; FAA § 620(s), note 371 supra; and FAA § 620(k). Similarly, the Fisherman's
Protective Act, § 5, supra note 351, and certain restrictions in P.L. 480 cannot be waived. For
one critical year, § 533A(d) of the Mutual Security Act, Act of July 24, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86108, § 401(h), 73 Stat. 253-54, requiring the disclosure of documents, could not be waived, or
at least the Comptroller General so maintained. See text accompanying note 325 supra.
To be sure, even the terms of non-waivable provisions are subject to interpretation and hence
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THE MANNER OF APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO
FOREIGN AID

JudicialDefinition

Judicial definition of the substantive area of the traditional core of
foreign affairs, and the controls from which it is immune, has been
incomplete. The reasons for this are several. Most core area decisions,
as defined above,3 7 do not have a direct impact on individual rights.
The remark of Martin F. Richman, then First Assistant, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, about committee vetoes seems
applicable: "Of course, this sort of thing inherently is very hard to get

into judicial frameworks. It is between the executive and the legislative
to some executive discretion. See Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318
(1958). Thus, for example, the phrase "take into account" in FAA § 620(s), note 371 supra,
certainly provides a great deal of flexibility. Some, if not a great amount of, flexibility has been
found in FAA § 620(e)(1). Thus, the direction that assistance be suspended to a "government"
might permit loans to private borrowers in a country to continue. So too, the requirement that
"appropriate steps" be taken to compensate within six months, has permitted an interpretation
that the commencement of good faith negotiations within that period, and not actual payment,
will suffice. See note 4 supra (Part I). As is inevitable with any statutory language, there is other
possible flexibility as well. For example, the provision that compensation be made "as required
by international law," although qualified by reference to "speedy compensation," "convertible
foreign exchange," and "equivalent to the full value" leaves a bit of elbow room.
On the other hand there are limits to "interpretation" and executive indulgence in it. Cf.
remarks of Senator Miller about executive interpretation of FAA § 620(e)(1) ("some
interpreters of what we do in Congress like to play games with words. .

"'), 109

CONG. REc.

21764 (1963); and such interpretation may lead, and has indeed led, to further tightening of
legislation. Thus, the suggestion that expropriations of "property" did not include repudiation
of contracts (by Argentina in 1963) led to the later addition of FAA § 620(e)(l)(B). STEINER &
VAGTS 374.

In this connection it should be noted that the existence of waiver authority can also be
deceptive. The President has rarely exercised his waiver authorities. An exception to this general
statement has been waiver of some restrictions on military assistance, e.g.. FAA § 505-but
the prospect of the relevant congressional committee support has made this possible. When
congressional support for waivers is not present, the result of the exercise of waiver authority can
be the elimination of it. This happened with respect to the so-called "country limitations"
(although FAA § 614(a) remains technically available). See note 373 supra.
A final problem with some waivers is that their public exercise may be embarrassing, because
of the determinations that they entail. Thus, FAA § 620(v) requires the President to find that
the purchase of sophisticated weapons by the recipient government "is important to the national
security of the United States." Cf. FAA § 504(a) (similar finding concerning military assistance
for such weapons). The publication of such a determination in some foreign countries would
certainly embarrass their governments. Possibly such determination can be classified; however,
620(v) in fact requires f report to the Congress; cf. problems ofexecutive secrecy, notes 324-30
supra and accompanying text.
376. See note 149-91 supra and accompanying text.
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and is usually resolved without affecting private rights." 377
Consequently, it may be difficult to find a justiciable "case or
controversy," or a party with suitable "standing" to raise the
relevant issues before a court. 378 As stated by Abram Chayes:
"Sometimes it is

. .

.difficult to formulate a satisfying claim on

behalf of a private party against which government action can be
tested. New claims are struggling to emerge all the time.

. .

but it is

by no means clear how they gain acceptance as a proper basis for
court consideration of government action."37'

The "political question" doctrine also helps to account for the lack
ofjudicial definition. According to Professor Corwin, it
explains the lack which we have frequently noted of definite legal criteria
for determining the scope of the President's powers in the field of foreign
relations and for deciding those contests for power in this field which have
frequently occurred between the President and Congress or the President and
the Senate. Such criteria lack because the courts have never had occasion
to develop them . . . because of this concept.P

Many explanations have been given for application of the doctrine
to particular cases.O l Among the principal ones would appear to be
"lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving 38 2 the issues involved; inability to formulate a suitable
remedy; 3 3 and generally, and possibly most crucially, whether the
matter is too "hot" politically for the court to handle 8 ' Another
explanation may be relevant to foreign affairs: the feeling that courts,
as instruments of the internal order, may not be especially equipped to
deal with the external one. 3 5 It is no doubt this which explains the
general deference of the courts to the "political departments"-both
377. See Hearings, Separation of Powers 142. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
378. The latter appears to be an aspect of the former. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S 83, 98
(1968). Standing requirements may be undergoing some relaxation. Id.
379. Chayes 1406.
380. CoRwiN-FomIGN RELTIONS 166-67.
381. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See, e.g., Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Scharpfl; cf.Chayes, supra note 318; Nathanson, The Supreme Courtas a Unit of the National
Government: Herein ofSeparation of Powers and PoliticalQuestions, 6 J.PUB. L. 331 (1957).
382. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) To this extent the doctrine appears to be an
aspect of the problem ofjusticiability. See Flast v. Cohen, 292 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
383. 369 U.S. at 198.
384. Scharpf.
385. See generally R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1964).

Vol. 1970.453]

FOREIGN AID

executive and legislative-in foreign affairs3 However, a careful
study of these areas of deference, including treaty interpretation,
sovereign immunity, and the act of state doctrine, 7 shows that it has
usually pertained to the questioned correctness of an exercise of
discretion, not to the constitutional limits on the area in which the
discretion can be exercised. 9
Questions of the separation of powers are not, it is submitted,
"political" questions-even in the area of foreign affairs.38 The
Supreme Court noted in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed
• I . is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. ' 390 On the other hand, Professor Chayes sounds a
warning note. He suggests, and quite rightly, that in point of fact most
accommodations between the executive and Congress do not take
place in the courts, but rather in the political ai-ena. He further
suggests that it is wrong to think of the executive and the Congress,
although certainly subject to the Constitution and its standards, as
"subjects" of law and the courts in the same sense as individuals. 9
Their practical power is such, relative to the courts, that their status is
more akin to nation-states in the international order whose subjection
to law is certainly problematic.0 12 While this is so, it perhaps proves
too much, for it applies equally to domestic affairs where the courts
have in fact taken on such tasks. Consider, for example, Myers v.
United States,93 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,39 United
States v. Klein,395 Powell v. McCormack396 or even cases involving the
386. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S 297 (1918).

387. Foreign affairs areas to which the political question doctrine has been applied are
discussed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962).
388. Cf. Chicago &S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
389. "[li]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance." 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
390. Id.; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

391. Chayes, supra note 318, at 1400; cf.Christie, The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE L.J.
649, 652 n.13; Hughes, Civil Disobedienceand the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1 (1968).
392. See generally Symposium, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A. 1 (1969).
393. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

394. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
395. 13 Wall. 128 (1871).

396. 395 U.S.486 (1969).
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question of the permitted extent of Congressional delegation of
authorityl 7
What are the chances of the foreign aid restriction questions
coming to the courts? De Toqueville once observed that "[s]carcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question.""'
Cases and
controversies-with parties of standing-can be contrived. The
follow-ing possibilities suggest themselves:
(1) Congress might, by statute, direct a particular company to
undertake a foreign enterprise within the "core area" and direct the
President to make payment to it. "
(2) The President might direct an executive official to disburse
funds in violation of a statute deemed by the President to be an
unconstitutional invasion of the core area, resulting in a violation of
such official's bond under 31 U.S.C. § 82c which the Comptroller
General would feel obligated to challenge!00 Presumably, however, the
Attorney General, who normally represents the Comptroller General
in prosecuting such violations, would not do so in this case. And, it is
difficult to conceive the Comptroller General retaining its own
counsel to initiate such prosecution'"
(3) The government might make a loan to a country in violation
of a statute and proceed to sell the notes to an American financial
institution, a shareholder of which might then challenge the propriety
of the purchase!" In fact, AID has rarely, if ever, taken notes on its
loans, and it is unlikely in the extreme that any financial institution
would buy them if it did and sought to sell them, especially if received
on a loan in violation of a statute.
(4) A foreign public or private borrower, disbursements under
397. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
398. A. DEToQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945). Of course it may take time.
For example, it took the Supreme Court 137 years to address certain questions concerning the
removal power, first raised in the "great debate" of 1789, in Myers v. United States, 272 US'.
52 (1926).
399. Cf Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Kendall v. United States ev rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 534 (1838).

400. Cf letter from Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach to Director of the Budget Gordon,
Dec. 18, 1963, with respect to "committee veto" provision in H.R. 9140, the 1964 Public Works
Appropriation (copy of letter in author's possession).
401. Cf.special counsel of Congress in United States v. Lovett, 328 US. 303 (1946). See also
Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 33 A.2d 366 (Ct. Ch. 1943), affd, 135 N.J. Eq. 244,
38 A.2d 199 (1944), where the Attorney General of New Jersey sued to enjoin an official from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute; Alaska v. American Can Co., 358 U.S. 224 (1959).
402. Cf.Smith v. Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
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whose loan were terminated pursuant to a statutory section, might sue
the United States Government0
(5) Conceivably, the Attorney General might seek a declaratory
judgment as to the constitutionality of a section and might be deemed
to have standing in the absence of a private party to raise the issue.
Cases (1)-(4) are most likely to involve restrictions found in classes
a-g discussed above which, on simple analogy to the balance struck
for the traditional core area, the court might quite easily find invalid.
Case (5) could involve such restrictions or restrictions of classes h and
i as well. With respect to the latter, judicial definition has been largely
non-existent.m Here the court would not only have to analogize the
substance of the new core area to the old, but determine whether some
of the "niceties" discussed constitute improper controls or not,
something it has not previously done.
Executive Initiativeand CongressionalRestraint

While judicial definition would certainly help, history suggests that
the executive and the Congress must themselves make the major
contribution to the resolution of the constitutional problem;
constitutional standards of separation of powers between executive
and legislature are as much, if not more, matters of political history as
of judicial precedent. In this respect, political history has not caught
up with foreign aid.
To be sure, a congressional-executive resolution may not draw as
fine lines as would "principled" and "rationalized" decisions by the
judiciaryPs On the other hand, the applicable standards would work
rather simply, at least in part. That is, there would be no controls of
classes a through g over that substantive part of the new core area
most analogous to the traditional core area. As for other parts of the
new core area and controls in classes h and i, some judicial definition,
once the executive and the Congress break the ice, might be indicated.
It is thus suggested that the ice will be broken only if Congress is
prepared to acknowledge the constitutional limitations upon itself and
restrain itself to stay within them. Although there is little, at least in
recent history, to suggest Congress would so restrain itself, it does not
lie beyond the realm of possibility. In the first instance, greater
executive restraint in foreign affairs, especially in those which trouble
403. Wilkins, supra note 308, at 999.
404. See notes 360-75 supra and accompanying text.
405. See generally Christie, supra note 391.
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Congress, may help matters. Thus, Senator Fulbright has stated,
"When the Executive tends to ignore Congressional
recommendations, intruding thereby on Congressional prerogative,
the result is either a counter-intrusion or the acceptance by the
Congress of the loss of its prerogatives."" 6 The restrictions on foreign
aid are clearly among the principal "counter-intrusions" Senator
Fulbright has in mind 07 Of course, Vietnam is not the first-nor
presumably the last-executive initiative to disturb considerable
elements in Congress!"s Moreover, congressional restrictions on aid
antedate Vietnam and are not, by any means, all reactions to
executive initiative. Rather, as Senator Fulbright has indicated:
"Foreign aid provides the closest thing we have to an annual occasion
for a general review of American foreign policy. It provides the
opportunity for airing grievances, some having to do with economic
development, most of them not. . . ."'l A review of foreign aid
legislation from its inception would give one a fairly good idea of
congressional foreign affairs worries, although the exact grievances
enacted into legislation depend to some extent on the accidental
0
coincidence of events and the legislative cycleP"
Continued improvement in the machinery and practice of
consultation and collaboration between the executive and Congress,
short of the statutory controls assailed in this article, especially with
respect to the development of consensus on major foreign policy
directions,' would help the process of reconciliation. Of course, new
and additional modalities of coordination of the executive and the
Congress are already developing. The executive has since World War
II increasingly consulted the Senate and House foreign affairs
leadership, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and elsewhere,
on all foreign affairs matters-not just treaties."' Whether such
consultation should and can extend beyond the leadership is
questionable.' The executive has acknowledged the importance of
406. Hearings,Separationof Powers44.

407. Id.
408. Our adhesion and commitment of troops to NATO and our action in Korea provoked
considerable congressional reactions. Mathews 363-65.
409. Hearings,Separationof Powers43.
410. Thus FAA § 620(o), note 334-35 supra and accompanying text (with respect to mob
action), was initially introduced as a "sense of Congress" provision in FAA § 102 by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 after the sacking of the USIA library in Cairo.
411. See note 328 supra.
412. See generally D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION (1969); Mathews 349.
413. Cf 1967 Hearings 151.
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such consultations and devices as the Tonkin Gulf resolution.!4 On

the other hand, Senator Fulbright notes that:
"Consultations" which are really only briefings, and resolutions like the Tonkin
Gulf resolution, represent no more than a ceremonial role for the Congress.
Their purpose is not to elicit the views of Congress but to avoid controversy of
the kind President Truman experienced over the Korean War. They are devices,
therefore, not of congressional consultation but of executive convenience.
Insofar as the Congress accepts them as a substitute for real participation, it is
an accomplice to a process of illicit constitutional revision."'

Senator Fulbright has proposed a number of innovations, one of
which is public hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
with expert witnesses giving testimony, to serve as a "forum"

to

assert values and objectives and to shape policy. 1 He has further
proposed congressional resolutions calling for congressional
concurrence by treaty, legislation, or other legislative expression in
4 17
certain national commitments.
The above proposals do not immediately concern the core." In
fact, as indicated in Part I, Congress retains many devices," 9 other
than the forbidden statutory controls, to check the executive's exercise
of its exclusive powers over the core area, including (1) various

indirect means of persuasion or compulsion4 20 and other private
communications; 4 2' (2) clearances with key legislators 22 and
understandings which may or may not be binding;423 (3) committee
414. Id. at75, 129 etseq., 187.
415. Hearings,Separation of Powers49; 1967 Hearings242.
416. Hearings.Separation of Powers52.

417. 1967 Hearings 242. Such new modalities of consultation as emerge should of course
leave the core area to the President. Thus Senator Fulbright has acknowledged that the
President's decision as Commander-in-Chief vis-A-vis Vietnam, while they may be the subject of
advice, are his alone to make. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1968, at 14, col.2 (city edition).
418. For a description of the traditional core area see notes 149-92 supra and accompanying
text (Part I).
419. See generally Ginnane, The Control Of Federal Administrations By Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1963); Newman & Keaton, Congressand
the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrator&? 41 CALIF. L.

568 (1953).
420. Whelan & Phillips, Government Contracts: Emphasis on Government, 29 LAW

REV.

&

CONTEMP. PRoB. 315,324 (1964).

421. Fenno, supra note 68, at 130 (Part I).
422. Newman & Keaton, supra note 247, at 566 n.3 (President's Eisenhower's instruction to
his cabinet to clear all major policy matters with Senator Taft).
423. Cf. 1967 Hearings 108 (Katzenbach: "Indeed, in some decisions, President Johnson has
come to the Congress where the power was already given him and authorized him.
For example, on the AID program to India, where the amount was so large he felt that the
Congress should have an opportunity to express itself on that point"). Id.

492

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:453

reports;4 4 (4) reports which the executive can be required to make;"
(5) annual hearings with respect to legislation and appropriations;-'
(6) investigations which, although in theory subject to a limitation
that they be for a "legislative purpose," can be a real source of
pressure on the executive; 27 (7) annual appropriations, short term
authorizations, and fiscal year funds;128 (8) certain general legislative
provisions, even if specific restrictions are prohibited;2 . (9) sense of
Congress provisions, resolutions and similar "advice";430 (10) the
force of public opinion;431 the consensus building process 3 and the
prospect of elections;'3 (11) the President's "conscience"'' 4 and "his
sense of self-restraint"--which are possibly the most significant
controls;35 and (12) ultimately, the "scarecrow '413 of impeachment.'
Congressional restraint is called for because of the
constitutional precedents, and for the constitutional reasons given,
Congress should be persuaded to abandon forbidden statutory
controls over the core area. In restraining itself, the Congress will
want to refrain from waivable, as well as unwaivable, restriclions,
primarily because of the inhibiting effect of the former. To he sure, .tlbe
executive will have to "push" to encourage and maintain
congressional self-restraint generally and to indicate the exact lines of
such self-restraint. Indeed it is arguable that the President, because of
424. C. Zinn, Role of Congress, supra note 175, at 18. It has been pointed out that committee
reports are not subject to revision by the full Congress, Hearings,Separation of Powers 193
(Professor Maas: "Appropriations Committee reports are filled with words of guidance, advice,
requests, warning and direction, so that a departmental budget officer may be as much or more
concerned with the committee report than he is with the appropriations statute. Yet the report is
extra-legal. Neither House of Congress votes on it. The President neither signs nor vetoes it").
425. C. Zinn, Extent of Control of Executive by Congress, supra note 175, at 19. But cf notes
225-39 supra and accompanying text (executive secrecy).
426. 1967 Hearings75.
427. GELLHORN& BYSE 176.

428. This can of course be a great control. Fenno, supra note 151.
429. Supra notes 189-90 (Part 1).
430. 1967 Hearings239.
431. Steelman & Kreager, supra note 233, at 691.
432. Supra note284.
433. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165 (1803). See 1967 Hearings 121. The
decision by Congress to withhold funds, if the swing in amount is large enough, is probably more
subject, although marginally so, to political repercussions than any restriction on the President's
discretion. Cf.41 OP. ATT'Y GEN. 32 (1949).
434. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165 (1803).
435. McDougal& Lans 615.
436. CoRwIN-- PlESIDENT 292.

437. 1967 Hearings.See Part I, pages 327-28.
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his Constitutional oath to "protect and defend the Constitution"'
against, among other things, congressional encroachment on his

powers,"' is duty bound to do so. The device that the President might
use-given an indication of congressional willingness to restrain

itself-is at hand in the presidential signing message. As we have seen,
the President has increasingly indicated in signing messages that he

will ignore certain provisions in legislation or treat them in such a way
as to avoid constitutional problems. 0 To be sure, the President
should use the device sparingly; But, he must have the will to use it.

The practical difficulties can not be 'ninimized. The executive's
annual requests for appropriations have been regularly cut by the

Congress, and congressional resentment of executive efforts to
disregard the restrictions could lead to further cuts. That is why
congressional self-restraint is the key to the proper accommodation of
congressional and executive interests. Congressional conviction that
executive initiatives with respect to foreign aid will not lead to

other "Vietnanms" is vital. But finally, there must be executive and
congressional realization that although foreign aid and economic
development are not now in the forefront of national priorities, they
438. U.S. CoNsT. art. 11,§ 1,cl.8".

439. Presidents have construed their oath as placing them under a duty to resist congressional
encroachment on their powers and have done so by various devices including vetoes, signing
messages declaring portions of statutes to be unconstitutional, and protests-successful and
otherwise-against pending legislation. Warren, PresidentialDeclarationsof Independence, 10
B.U.L. REv. 1, 3 (1930). President Eisenhower, at the time of the Bricker Amendment
controversy, said, "As President I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution. I therefore
oppose any change which will impair the President's traditional authority to conduct foreign
affairs." Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes,
67 HARV. L. REv. 281,283 (1953). President Buchanan stated that the people have "rights and
prerogatives" in the President's execution of his office which each President is under a duty to
see "shall never be violated in his person" and shall "pass on to his successors unimpaired by
the adoption of a dangerous precedent." Warren, supra.at 35.
440. See. e.g.. notes 316-18 supra (P.L. 480 committee vetoes) and 315 (Spanish loan). Cf
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1968, § 4, at 13, col. 8 (city edition) (report that President would ignore
certain sections of crime bill as unconstitutional). See also President Tyler's early resort to a
similar device. Warren, supra note 439, at 13. To be sure this device resembles an "item veto"
which the President does not have. 80; Note, The Legislative Rider and the Veto Power, 26
GEo. L.J. 954 (1938). The President may of course use his regular veto power to resist what
he conceives to be unconstitutional encroachments. CoRwIN-PESIDENT 80.
The signing message device, if valid, might raise questions of separability. Cf. Stern,
Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1937).
FAA § 646 provides that the validity of the remainder of the FAA will not be affected if any
provision "shall be held invalid."
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remain so in global priorities and will one day reassert themselves in
our own thinking. When that time comes, as it will, the executive must
have restored to itself the freedom it will need to do the job properly.

This will take congressional and executive self control"
441. James Madison once wrote, "In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first get the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (H.
Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison). "Our scheme of society is more dependent than any other form of
government on knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for the achievement of its aims."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J,,
concurring).

